Abstract. In a range proof, the prover convinces the verifier in zeroknowledge that he has encrypted or committed to a value a ∈ [0, H] where H is a public constant. Most of the previous non-interactive range proofs have been proven secure in the random oracle model. We show that one of the few previous non-interactive range proofs in the common reference string (CRS) model, proposed by Yuen et al. in COCOON 2009, is insecure. We then construct a secure non-interactive range proof that works in the CRS model. The new range proof can have (by different instantiations of the parameters) either very short communication (14 080 bits) and verifier's computation (81 pairings), short combined CRS length and communication (log 1/2+o(1) H group elements), or very efficient prover's computation (Θ(log H) exponentiations).
Introduction
In a range proof, the prover convinces the verifier in zero-knowledge that he has encrypted or committed to a value a ∈ [0, H], where H is a public constant. Range proofs are needed in a wide variety of cryptographic protocols, like e-voting (to show that a ballot corresponds to a valid candidate), e-auctions, anonymous credentials, e-cash, or any other protocol that needs for its correctness that the inputs are from a valid range. Given the need for range proofs in a large variety of protocols, it is not surprising that there is a large amount of research on this topic.
Most of the existing efficient range proofs fall in one of the next two categories. The first category uses a classical result of Lagrange that every non-negative integer is a sum of four squares [13, 7, 21] . However, in this case the underlying group has to be of unknown order which seriously limits the available cryptographic techniques. In particular, all known secure Lagrange's theorem based range proofs are based on operations in Z that we break the range proof of [21] where the Lagrange theorem is used in the bilinear setting with known group order.) Due to such considerations, one usually considers the second approach. There, one uses the fact that a ∈ [16] (by using methods from additive combinatorics), Chaabouni, Lipmaa and shelat [4] showed that there exist (efficiently computable) coefficients G i such that (u − 1)a ∈ (u − 1)
. The range proof from [4] has the communication complexity of Θ(log u H + u) group elements, which obtains the minimal value Θ(log H/ log log H) if u ≈ log H/ log log H. (See [9] for recent related work.)
Usually, it is desired that the range proof is non-interactive. For example, in the e-voting scenario, range proof is a part of the vote validity proof that is verified by various parties without any active participation of the voter. Most of the previous non-interactive range proofs first construct a Σ-protocol which is then made non-interactive in the random oracle model by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. While the random oracle model allows to construct efficient protocols, it is also known that there exist protocols that are secure in the random oracle models and insecure in the plain model.
Motivated by this, [5, 21, 18] have proposed non-interactive range proofs without random oracles. The range proof from [5] is of mainly theoretical value. The range proof from [21] uses Lagrange's theorem, but we will demonstrate an attack on it. The range proof from [18] combines the range proof of [3] with the GrothSahai non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [11] and P-signatures. The range proof from [18] is not claimed to be zero-knowledge (only NIWI, that is, non-interactive witness-indistinguishable).
We first show that the protocol from [21] is insecure. Their protocol works in a group of known order. In this case, using Lagrange's theorem to prove that a non-negative number is the sum of four squares fails. We can only conclude that the sum of four squares is computed modulo the group order. Hence an attacker can prove that any number is "non-negative" and completely break the protocol in [21] . See Sect. 4 for more information.
We then construct a new NIZK range proof (for an encrypted a -if one needs a to be committed, one can use the same cryptosystem as a perfectly binding commitment) that works in the common-reference string model. We do this by using recent NIZK arguments by Groth and Lipmaa [8, 15] . We also use the additive combinatorics results from [4] , that is, we base a range proof
, where G i are as defined in [4] . However, differently from [4] , we prove that b i ∈ [0, u−1] by proving (by a recursive use of the method from [16, 4] )
Here, n v := log 2 (u − 1) . By using the commitment scheme of [8, 15] that enables to succinctly commit to a vector (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and the Hadamard product argument of [8, 15] , we can do all n v + 1 small range proofs in parallel. In addition, in Sect. 5 we construct a new non-interactive argument that a knowledge-commited value is equal to a BBS-encrypted [2] value. (Due to the use of knowledge assumptions, this proof is computationally more efficient than the one constructed by using Groth-Sahai proofs [11] .) The new range proof does not rely on the random oracle model or use any proofs of knowledge of signatures.
The conceptual novelty of the new range proof as compared to all previous range proofs of the "second approach" is that in all latter schemes, a ∈ [0, H] is proven by executing in parallel N ≈ log u H smaller zero-knowledge proofs of type b i ∈ [0, u − 1]. In the new range proof, N elements b i are arranged in an n v × n matrix, where it takes only one zero-knowledge proof (the complexity of which depends on n) to prove that all elements in one row belong to the range [0, u −1] . By appropriately choosing the values n v and n (and u), one can achieve different complexity trade-offs.
The complexity of the new range proof is described in Tbl. 1. Setting u = 2 results in a constant argument length (but CRS of Θ((log H) 1+o(1) ) group elements). By using an efficient variation of Barreto-Naehrig curves (where the group elements are either 256 or 512 bits), the communication drops to 14 080 bits. The range proof of [18] does not allow for constant communication. Moreover, if u = 2 then the communication is even smaller than that of the known range proofs based on the Lagrange's theorem like [13] . We note that constant communication is achieved since the new range proof uses permutation arguments only for permutations that do not depend on the statement. On the other hand, setting u = H results in summatory CRS and argument length of log 1/2+o(1) H, and setting u = 2 √ log H results in prover's computational complexity dominated by Θ(log H) exponentiations. The previous non-interactive range proofs did not allow for such a flexibility.
One can obtain a zap (that is, a 2-message public-coin witnessindistinguishable proof) from the NIZK range proof by first letting the verifier create and send a CRS to the prover, and then letting the prover to send Table 1 . Comparison of NIZK arguments for range proof. Here, M/E/P means the number of multiplications, exponentiations and pairings. Communication is given in group elements. Here, nv = log(u − 1) , n ≈ log H/ log u and ε = o (1) , and the basis of all logarithms is 2. To fit in page margins, in this table only, we write h = log 2 H.
CRS length Argument length
Prover comp. Verifier comp.
[18]
the range proof to the verifier. This zap works in the standard model (without needing a CRS since it is generated on run) and has the total communication log
Preliminaries
Let S n be the set of permutations from [n] to [n] . By a, we denote the vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). If A is a value, then x ← A means that x is set to A. If A is a set, then x ← A means that x is picked uniformly and randomly from A. If y = h x , then let log h y := x. Let κ be the security parameter. We abbreviate probabilistic polynomial-time as PPT, and let negl(κ) be a negligible function. We say that
By using notation from additive combinatorics, if Λ 1 and Λ 2 are subsets of some additive group (Z or Z p within this paper), then [20] .
A set {λ 1 , . . . , λ n } ⊂ Z + is progression-free, if no three of the numbers are in arithmetic progression, so that λ i + λ j = 2λ k only if i = j = k. Let r 3 (N ) denote the cardinality of the largest progression-free set that belongs to [N ] .
Recently, Elkin [6] showed that r 3 
5 / log N ) [19] . Thus, the minimal N such that r 3 (N ) = n is ω(n), while according to Elkin, N = n 1+o (1) .
Fact 1 (Lipmaa [15]).
For any fixed n > 0, there exists N = n 1+o (1) , such that [N ] contains a progression-free subset Λ of odd integers of cardinality n. Bilinear Groups. Let G bp (1 κ ) be a bilinear group generator that outputs a description of a bilinear group gk := (p,
Moreover, it is efficient to decide the membership in G 1 , G 2 and G T , group operations and the pairingê are efficiently computable, generators are efficiently sampleable, and the descriptions of the groups and group elements each are O(κ) bit long. One can implement an optimal (asymmetric) Ate pairing [12] over a subclass of Barreto-Naehrig curves [1, 17] very efficiently. In that case, at security level of 128-bits, an element of G 1 /G 2 /G T can be represented in respectively 256/512/3072 bits.
A bilinear group generator G bp is DLIN (decisional linear) secure [2] in group G t , for t ∈ {1, 2}, if for all non-uniform PPT adversaries A, the next probability is negligible in κ:
Let Λ be an (n, κ)-nice tuple for some n = poly(κ). A bilinear group generator G bp is Λ-PSDL secure, if for any non-uniform PPT adversary A,
Let Λ be an (n, κ)-nice tuple. According to [15] , any successful generic adversary for Λ-PSDL requires time Ω( p/λ n ) where p is the group order and λ n is the largest element of Λ. The soundness of NIZK arguments (for example, an argument that a computationally binding commitment scheme commits to 0) seems to be an unfalsifiable assumption in general. We will use a weaker version of soundness in the case of subarguments, but in the case of the range proof, we will prove soundness. Similarly to [8, 15] , we will base the soundness of that argument on an explicit knowledge assumption.
For two algorithms A and X A , we write (y; z) ← (A||X A )(x) if A on input x outputs y, and X A on the same input (including the random tape of A) outputs z. Let Λ be an (n, κ)-nice tuple for some n = poly(κ). Consider t ∈ {1, 2}. The bilinear group generator G bp is Λ-PKE secure in group G t if for any non-uniform PPT adversary A there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor X A ,
Groth [8] proved that the [n]-PKE assumption holds in the generic group model; his proof can be modified to the general case.
In the case of both the PSDL and PKE assumptions, we will define straightforward generalizations in Sect. 5.
BBS Cryptosystem.
A public-key cryptosystem (G pkc , Enc, Dec) is a triple of efficient algorithms (key generation, encryption, and decryption), where for any (sk, pk) ← G pkc (1 κ ) and any valid m and randomizer r, Dec sk (Enc pk (m; r)) = m. A cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure, if for any (sk, pk) ← G pkc (1 κ ) and any two messages m 0 and m 1 , the distributions Enc pk (m 0 ; ·) and Enc pk (m 1 ; ·) are computationally indistinguishable. In the lifted BBS cryptosystem [2] (in group G 1 ), the system parameters are equal to (gk; g 1 ), where gk ← G bp (1 κ ) and
Commitment Schemes in the CRS Model. A (batch) commitment scheme (G com , Com) in a bilinear group consists of two PPT algorithms: a randomized CRS generation algorithm G com , and a randomized commitment algorithm Com.
, produces a CRS ck t , and Com t (ck t ; a; r), with a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), outputs a commitment value
is opened by revealing (a, r). A commitment scheme (G com , Com) is computationally binding in group G t , if for every non-uniform PPT adversary A and positive integer n = poly(κ),
A commitment scheme (G com , Com) is perfectly hiding in group G t , if for any positive integer n = poly(κ) and ck t ∈ G We use the knowledge commitment scheme, defined in [15] , as follows. 
The case t = 2 is dual. According to [15] , the knowledge commitment scheme is statistically hiding in group G t , and computationally binding in group G t under the Λ-PSDL assumption in group G t . If the Λ-PKE assumption holds in group G t , then for any non-uniform PPT algorithm A, that outputs some valid knowledge commitments, there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor X A that, given as an input the input of A together with A's random coins, extracts the contents of these commitments. The knowledge commitment scheme is also trapdoor, with the trapdoor being td = x: after trapdoor-committing A ← Com
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge. Let R = {(C, w)} be an efficiently computable binary relation such that |w| = poly(|C|). Here, C is a statement, and w is a witness. Let L = {C : ∃w, (C, w) ∈ R} be an NP-language. Let n = |C| be a fixed input length. For fixed n, we have a relation R n and a language L n . A non-interactive argument for R consists of the next PPT algorithms: a common reference string (CRS) generator G crs , a prover P, and a verifier V. For crs ← G crs (1 κ , n), P(crs; C, w) produces an argument ψ. The verifier V(crs; C, ψ) outputs either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
A non-interactive argument (G crs , P, V) is perfectly complete, if for all values n = poly(κ), all crs ← G crs (1 κ , n) and all (C, w) ∈ R n , V(crs; C, P(crs; C, w)) = 1. A non-interactive argument (G crs , P, V) is computationally (adaptively) sound, if for all non-uniform PPT adversaries A and all n = poly(κ),
A non-interactive argument (G crs , P, V) is perfectly witness-indistinguishable, if (given that there are several possible witnesses) it is impossible to tell which witness the prover used. That is, for all n = poly(κ), if crs ∈ G crs (1 κ , n) and ((C, w 0 ), (C, w 1 )) ∈ R 2 n , then the distributions P(crs; C, w 0 ) and P(crs; C, w 1 ) are equal. (G crs , P, V) is perfectly zero-knowledge, if there exists a polynomialtime simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ), such that for all stateful interactive non-uniform PPT adversaries A and n = poly(κ),
System parameters: Let n = poly(κ). Let Λ = {λi : i ∈ [n]} be a progression-free set of odd integers, such that λi+1 > λi > 0. Denote λ0 := 0. LetΛ := {0}∪Λ∪2 Λ. A,Â, B,B, B2, C,Ĉ), (a, ra, b, r b , c, rc) 
Argument generation P×(crs; (
Here, td is the simulation trapdoor. (G crs , P, V) is computationally zero-knowledge if these two probabilities are computationally indistinguishable.
Groth-Lipmaa Arguments
In this section, we describe two of our building-blocks, an Hadamard product argument and a (known) permutation argument. In both cases, Groth [8] proposed efficient (weakly) sound and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) arguments that were further refined by Lipmaa [15] , who used the theory of progression-free sets to optimize Groth's arguments. Since [15] is very new, we will give here a full description of Lipmaa's NIWI arguments. We refer to [15] (and its full version, [14] ) for details.
Hadamard Product Argument
Let (G com , Com) be the knowledge commitment scheme. An Hadamard product of two vectors a and b is equal to their entrywise product vector c, that is, c j = a j ·b j for j ∈ [n]. In an Hadamard product argument, the prover aims to convince the verifier that for given three commitments 
, and for some
For the product argument to be useful in more complex arguments, we must also assume that the verifier there additionally verifies thatê(A,ĝ 2 ) =ê(Â, g 2 ), e (B,ĝ 2 ) =ê(B, g 2 ),ê(g 1 , B 2 ) =ê(B, g 2 ) , andê(C,ĝ 2 ) =ê(Ĉ, g 2 ). Note that (f s ) s∈Λ is the opening of (ψ,ψ). 
Fact 3 (Lipmaa [15]). For any
n > 0 and y = n 1+o(1
Permutation Argument
In a permutation argument, the prover aims to convince the verifier that for given permutation ∈ S n and two commitments (A, , where B 2 is again the equivalent of B in G 2 . As in the case of the Hadamard product argument, we describe a version of the argument due to [15] . See Prot. 2.
Let
by using a subargument that shows that for separately committed a * i , a *
. We only consider the case where is fixed and thus the element E can be put to the CRS. We also use the fact thatΛ ∪Λ = {0} ∪Λ, whereΛ is defined in Prot. 2.
We 
System parameters: Same as in Prot. 1, but letΛ :
Let ck1 ← (gk; (g 1 ,ĝ 1 ) ∈{0}∪Λ ), ck1 ← (gk; (g 1 ,g 1 ) ∈{0}∪Λ ). Common inputs: (A,Ã, B,B,B, ) , where ∈ Sn, (A,Ã) ← Com 1 ( ck1; a; ra), (A,Ã, B,B,B, ) , (a, ra, b, r b )):
Argument generation Pperm(crs;
,ψ ←D
2 to the verifier as the argument. Verification Vperm(crs; (A,Ã, B,B 
Protocol 2. Permutation argument ([[(A,Ã)]]) = [[(B,B)]] from [15]
such that (A,Ã)
For the permutation argument to be useful in more complex arguments, we must also assume that the verifier there verifies thatê(Ã, g 2 ) =ê(A,g 2 ),ê(B, g 2 ) = e(B,ĝ 2 ), andê(B, g 2 ) =ê(B,g 2 ). 
Fact 5 (Lipmaa [15]). The permutation argument has a CRS of length

Breaking the COCOON 2009 Range Proof
In [21] , the authors proposed a non-interactive range proof. In what follows, we show that their argument is not secure.
Their goal is to prove that a committed secret w is in some range [a, b] . To do so they prove that both w − a and b − w are non-negative by making use of Lagrange theorem stating that any non-negative integer can be decomposed as the sum of four squares. Hence,
for some w ij . The range proof of [21] is based on (symmetric) bilinear groups of composite order, i.e., on bilinear groups (n, G, G T ,ê), where n = pq. To commit to a message w, the committer picks a random 1 r ∈ Z q and computes C = g w u r , where g is a random generator of G (of order n), and u is a random generator of subgroup G q (of order q). Given C, w is uniquely determined in Z p as C q = g wq . In their range proof, the prover finds the witnesses w ij in Eq. (1) and outputs a proof ψ = ({C 1j , C 2j } j∈ [4] , C w , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ), where
. Now assume that a malicious prover P picks an integer w
We have that either w * − a or b − w * is negative as an integer. Suppose 
We have successfully constructed a polynomial time adversary who can always break the scheme. Therefore, the NIZK range proof in [21] is not sound.
New Subargument for Correct Encryption
In the new range proof of Sect. 6, we need a subargument that if (A c ,Ā c ) is a knowledge-commitment of some a (with n = 1 and some randomness r), and
, f r f , h r h ) for randomness (r f , r h ) and public key (f, h). (The generator g 1,λ1 is required in Sect. 6.)
We will construct this argument in the current section, by combining ideas from [11] and [8, 15] (1)), where ψ "compensates" for the fact that Com(a m ) are probabilistic commitments. In addition, we use knowledge commitments (though for small values 0 or 1 of n) so that one can extract all committed values. Since the argument uses three committed values (a, r f and r h ) and three equations, according to Fig. 6 of [10] (the full version of [11] ), the corresponding pure Groth-Sahai argument will have length of 15 group elements. Our argument has the same length, but is computationally more efficient.
System parameters: An (n, κ)-nice tuple
. The common reference string is
A third party also creates sk := (sk 1 , sk 2 ) ← (Z * p )
2 , and sets pk :=
1,f ,g
1,h ).
Common inputs: (crs
As mentioned in Sect. 2, to prove the security of this argument, we will need a generalization of the PSDL and PKE assumptions.
Let Φ ⊂ Z[X], with d := max ϕ∈Φ deg ϕ, be a set of linearly independent polynomials, such that |Φ|, all coefficients of all ϕ ∈ Φ, and d are polynomial in κ. Let 1 be the polynomial φ(x) = 1. We say that a bilinear group generator G bp is Φ-PSDL secure, if for any non-uniform PPT adversary A,
is negligible in κ. By a straightforward generalization of the proof from [15] , any successful generic adversary for Φ-PSDL requires time Ω( p/d), where p is the group order. Let Φ be as before. Consider t ∈ {1, 2}. The bilinear group generator G bp is Φ-PKE secure in group G t if for any non-uniform PPT adversary A there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor
is negligible in κ. Groth's proof [8] that the [n]-PKE assumption holds in the generic group model can be modified to the general case.
Note that G bp is Λ-PSDL secure (resp., Λ-PKE secure) iff it is {X λ : λ ∈ Λ}-PSDL secure (resp., {X λ : λ ∈ Λ}-PKE secure).
Theorem 1. The argument of this subsection is a perfectly argument for the next claim: for some
a, r f , r h ∈ Z p , A c = g r 1 g a 1,λ1 and (A g , A f , A h ) = (g r f +r h +a , f r f , h r h ). If the {1 − X λ1 }-PSDL assumption and the {1 − X λ1 }- PKE assumption (in both G 1 and G 2 ) hold,
then this argument is computationally sound. If the DLIN assumption holds in group G 1 , then this argument is computationally zero-knowledge.
(The proof of this theorem is given in App. A.) Clearly, this argument has CRS of length Θ(1), its argument consists of 13 elements of G 1 and 2 elements of G 2 . The prover's computational complexity is dominated by 20 exponentiations. The verifier's computational complexity is dominated by 33 pairings.
New Range Proof
In the next range proof, the prover has an encrypted a ∈ Z p , and he aims to convince the verifier that a ∈ [0, H]. We will use the lifted BBS cryptosystem (G pkc , Enc, Dec) that can be thought of as a perfectly binding commitment scheme if decryption is not necessary. Since we are interested in obtaining a sublinear argument, we will also use the (computationally binding) knowledge commitment scheme (G com , Com). We use the following result that was stated for u = 2 in [16] and for general u in [4] .
Fact 6.
Let H > 0 and u > 1. Let (u, H) ≤ log u (H + 1) be defined as in [4] .
Then a ∈ [0, H] if and only if for some
The precise values of (u, H) and G i are not important in the next description. It suffices to know that they can be efficiently evaluated. We note that The prover then commits to the vector (c 1 , . . . , c n ), where c j = n i=j G i b i , and shows that the values c j are correctly computed by using a small constant number of Hadamard product and permutation arguments. More precisely, he commits to (G 1 b 1 , . . . , G n b n ) (and shows this has been done correctly), then to (c 2 , . . . , c n , c 1 ) (and shows this was done correctly), then to (c 2 , . . . , c n , 0) (and shows this was done correctly), and then shows that (c 1 , . . . , c n ) = (G 1 b 1 , . . . , G n b n ) + (c 2 , . . . , c n , 0). Thus, the verifier is convinced that c j =
, and thus the prover has to show (by using a single product argument) that (A 
The prover does the following:
1.
Create an argument
(A * ,Â * , ψ × 2 ,ψ × 2 , ψ rot 2 ,ψ rot = [[(Crot,Ĉrot,Crot)]].
Create
an argument ck 1 ; 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0; 0),
Create an argument
(ψ × 4 ,ψ × 4 ) for [[(C,Ĉ)]] • [[(Com 1 ( ck 1 ; 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0; 0), g 2,λ 1 )]] = [[(A u−1 c ,Â u−1 c )]].
Create an argument ψ ce
5 that Ac commits to the same value that
(b) Verify (ψ j ,ψ j ) for inputs as specified above.
4. Verify the arguments This argument is computationally zero-knowledge because (A c ,Â c ) was provided by a prover and not generated during the argument. To achieve perfect zeroknowledge, one must be able to open (A c ,Â c ) given only the CRS trapdoor. That is, one has to use an extractable commitment scheme. It is easy to see that the knowledge commitment scheme is extractable, however, extractability is only achieved under the PKE assumption. The use of a cryptosystem also makes achieving perfect zero-knowledge impossible.
Protocol 3. The new range proof
Let Λ := {0} ∪ Λ ∪ 2 Λ, andΛ be as in Sect. 3.2. Let rot ∈ S n be such that rot(i) = i − 1 if i > 1,
Proof ([Of Thm. 2). Perfect completeness:
Recall that in the case of the product arguments, the inputs of P are (A,Â, B,B, B 2 , C,Ĉ). Within this proof we say that (B,B, B 2 ) (assuming B 2 is correctly defined, that is,ê(B, g 2 ) = e(g 1 , B 2 )) commits to the same values as (B,B).
The pairing verifications (for example, thatê(K,ĝ 2 ) =ê(K, g 2 )) hold by construction of the protocol. Since (B j ,B j ) commits to (b j1 , . . . , b jn ) for binary b ji then the argument (ψ j ,ψ j ) verifies.
Note that (
Computational soundness: let A be a non-uniform PPT adversary who creates a statement (pk, A g , A f , A h , A c ,Â c ) and an accepting range proof ψ. By the DLIN assumption, the BBS cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure, and thus the adversary obtains no information from (A g , A f , A h ). By the Λ-PKE and the {1−X λ1 }-PKE assumptions, there exists a non-uniform PPT extractor X A that, running on the same inputs and seeing A's random tape, extracts the following openings: ), (C rot ,Ĉ rot ,C rot ) as in the argument, but replacing a with 0 and r with r . (Note that all the mentioned commitments just commit to 0.) Thus, the simulator can simulate all product and permutation arguments and the argument of Sect. 5. Clearly, this simulated argument ψ sim is perfectly indistinguishable from the real argument ψ. Proof. The communication complexity: n v + 1 tuples (B j ,B j , B j2 , ψ j ) (each has 2 elements of G 1 and 3 elements of G 2 ), and then 8 extra elements from G 1 , 3 Hadamard product arguments (2 elements from G 2 each), 1 permutation argument (2 elements from G 1 and 4 elements from G 2 ), and argument ψ ce (13 elements from G 1 and 2 elements from G 2 ). In total, thus 2(n v +1)+8+2+13 = 2n v + 25 elements from G 1 and 3(n v + 1) + 3 · 2 + 4 + 2 = 3n v + 15 elements from G 2 .
The prover's computational complexity is dominated by (n v + 1) + 3 = n v + 4 Hadamard product arguments and 1 permutation argument (Θ(n 2 ) scalar multiplications and bilinear-group n 1+o(1) exponentiations each), that is in total Θ(n 2 · n v ) = Θ(n 2 · log u) scalar multiplications and n 1+o(1) log u exponentiations.
The verifier's computational complexity is dominated by verifying n v + 4 Hadamard product arguments (5 pairings each), 1 permutation argument (12 pairings) , and the argument ψ ce (33 pairings). In addition, the verifier performs 2 · (2(n v + 1) + 6) = 4n v + 16 pairings. The total number of pairings is thus 9n v + 81. The rest follows.
The communication complexity is minimized when n v (and thus u) is as small as possible, that is, u = 2. Then n v = log 2 1 = 0. In this case the communication consists of 12 elements from G 1 and 13 elements from G 2 . The same choice u = 2 is also optimal for verifier's computational complexity (81 pairings). As noted before, at the security level of 2 128 , elements of G 1 can be represented in 256 bits, and elements of G 2 in 512 bits. Thus, at this security level, if u = 2 then the communication is 25 · 256 + 25 · 512 = 14 080 bits, that is, only about 4 to 5 times longer than the current recommended length of a 2 128 -secure RSA modulus. Therefore, the communication of the new range proof is even smaller than that of Lagrange theorem based arguments like [13] .
The optimal prover's computational complexity is achieved when the number of exponentiations, n 1+o(1) ·n v = (log H/ log u) 1+o(1) · log 2 (u−1) , is minimized. This happens if u = H, then the prover's computation is dominated by Θ(log H) scalar multiplications and exponentiations. Moreover, in this case the CRS length n 1+o (1) is constant. Finally, we might want the summatory length of the CRS and the communication to be minimal, that is, n 1+o(1) + Θ(n v ). Considering n ≈ log u H and n v ≈ log 2 u, we get that the sum is (log H/ log u) 1+o(1) +Θ(log u).
One can approximately minimize the latter by choosing u = e √ ln H . Then the summatory length is log 1/2+o(1) H. (In this case, it would make sense to change the role of groups G 1 and G 2 to get better efficiency.) The efficiency of the new range proof in all three cases is given in Tbl. 1.
